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COMMENTS
PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND OF FACT
Courts speak of "presumptions of law" and of "presumptions of
fact." It is the purpose of this article to analyze these terms and to
set forth their function and effect in the trial of a lawsuit.
In a recent Wisconsin case the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, having found the defendant's agent to have been negligent
as to lookout, speed and failing to yield the right of way in the man-
agement of the defendant's car. The defendant contended that the
trial judge committed error by refusing to instruct the jury that the
deceased was presumed to have exercised due care in approaching
and attempting to cross the intersection where the collision occurred.
The trial court was upheld in its refusal to give the instruction because
the presumption of due care on the part of a deceased is a presumption
of law which disappears and ceases to have any force or effect what-
soever when credible evidence contrary to it comes into the case. The
court said that the presumption is a procedural device which allocates
the burden of going forward with the evidence and that when such
contrary evidence is produced the office of the presumption has then
been performed and the fact in question is to be established by the
evidence without the presumption being thrown into the scales and
weighed.
A presumption of law has been defined as a deduction which the
law expressly directs to be made from particular facts.2 In actuality
it is a rule of law which declares that one fact is presumed to exist
if another fact or set of facts is proved. A classic example of a pre-
sumption of law is the presumption of death that arises when a person
is shown to have been continually absent from his home for seven
years and has not been heard from during such period by persons who
would naturally have heard from him had he been alive.3 Presump-
tions of law are artificial creations because while "presumptions de-
clared by the courts should have the support of reason,"4 there is often
no logical connection between the presumed fact and the proven fact.
Legal presumptions usually arise from considerations of public policy;
for purposes of convenience; from a desire to provide an escape from
a dilemma; or to force a litigant to whom certain information is more
easily accessible to make it known.5 Certainly, logic does not require
1 Kreft v. Charles, 268 Wis. 44, 66 N.W.2d 618 (1954).
2 Egger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 333, 234 N.W. 328
(1931).3 Page v. Modern Woodmen of America, 162 Wis. 259, 156 N.W. 137 (1916);
Estate of Langer, 243 Wis. 561, 11 N.W.2d 185 (1943); Swenson v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 432, 17 N.W.2d 584 (1945).
4 Egger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 1 at 334.5Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
HARV. L. REv. 59 (1933).
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us to conclude from the fact of death that the deceased, immediately
prior thereto, exercised due care for his safety; however, it is a con-
clusion which accords with the judicial concept of sound social policy.6
A presumption of fact has been described as the process of ascer-
taining one fact from the existence of another without the aid of any
rule of law.7 The term is used to denote the reasoning or fact finding
process of the triers of the facts and as such it is a logical and not a
legal deduction of one fact from another. 8 The presumption is drawn
from the circumstances of the case by the ordinary reasoning powers
and not by virtue of any rule of law. It is "an inference which a
reasonable person would as a rule draw from given circumstances."9
A presumption of guilt may arise from proof that the defendant, when
arrested, was in possession of stolen goods and was attempting to leave
the country. The presumption would be one of fact since there is no
legal rule which compels the presumption to be made.
Presumptions of law differ from presumptions of fact in this
essential respect: the former are fixed rules of law which compel a
certain inference to be drawn from particular facts; the latter are
mere logical arguments that are derived entirely and directly from the
circumstances of the particular case and which depend not upon a rule
of law but upon their own natural force and efficacy in generating
belief."0
Both Wigmore and Greenleaf have severely criticized the term "pre-
sumption of fact" and have urged that the term be abandoned by the
courts." To these learned men "there is in truth but one kind of a pre-
sumption; and the term 'presumption of fact' should be discarded as
useless and confusing." 12 To appreciate the significance of the Wig-
more-Greenleaf position it is necessary to understand the effect and
function of presumptions in the trial of a lawsuit.
A presumption of law states the legal effect of facts and operates
to control the decision on a group of unopposed facts.13 Its effect is
to invoke a rule of law which compels the jury to find the presumed
fact so long as the facts upon which the presumption arises are not
opposed by contrary evidence from the opponent. 14 Because of this
6 For other cases involving legal presumptions whose basic facts have no pro-
bative value as to the existence of their presumed facts consider Estate of
Flierl, 225 Wis. 493, 274 N.W. 422 (1937) (executed promissory note presumed
to be supported by consideration), and Thomson v. Thomson, 236 Mo. App.
1223, 163 S.W.2d 792 (1942) (valid ceremonial marriage presumed from evi-
dence of cohabitation, general repute and conduct of the parties).
7 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed), §48.
8 See THAYER, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898) 539-550.
9 Anderson v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, 579, 119 N.W. 342 (1909).
10 1 GREENLEAF, op. cit., supra note 7, §44.
111 Ibid., §14(y); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2491 (3d ed. 1940).
12 Ibid.
13 9 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 11, §2490.
14 State ex rel Northwestern Development Corp. v. Gehrz, 230 Wis. 412, 283 N.W.
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effect, the function of the presumption of law is to cast upon the party
against whom it operates the duty to come forward with rebutting
evidence if he desires to avoid a finding against him on the particular
issue to which the presumption relates. Thus, where the death of X
is at issue and the plaintiff has produced evidence showing that X
has been absent from his home for seven years and that his friends
and relatives received no tidings from him during the period of his
absence, the presumption that X is dead arises as a matter of law. If
the defendant fails to come forward with rebutting evidence, the court
will direct the jury that X's death has been established by virtue of
the legal presumption and that they are not free to find otherwiseY
Wigmore accordingly defines the presumption as "essentially a rule of
law laid down by the judge and which attaches to an evidentiary fact
certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other
evidence by the opponent."'
Presumptions of fact do not control decision on a group of un-
opposed facts; instead, their effect is merely to permit decision. They
do not affect the burden of going forward with the evidence because
no rule of law attaches to them requiring the jury to find in favor
of the presumed fact in the absence of rebutting evidence.1 7 The party
against whom the presumption operates will not subject himself to
an adverse ruling by the court if he fails to come forward with con-
trary evidence since the court cannot direct the jury to find in favor
of the presumed fact. Assuming for the purpose of illustration that
there is no legal presumption of death arising from the facts set forth
in our example above, then, when the plaintiff establishes the same
set of facts and the defendant fails to come forward with rebutting
evidence, the court will not direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Instead,
the issue will go to the jury who will be free to find that death has
or has not occurred.' 8 Should the jury conclude that X is dead, the
827 (1939) ; Smith v. City of Green Bay, 223 Wis. 427, 271 N.W. 28 (1937);
McNamer v. American Ini. Co., 267 Wis. 494, 66 N.W.2d 342 (1954).
1s Page v. Modern Woodmen of America, spra note 2 at 263: "This entitled the
plaintiff to a direction of the verdict in her favor on this issue, and it was
error for the trial court to refuse to direct the jury to render a verdict accord-
ingly."
16 9 WIGMORE, Op. cit., supra note 11.
17 1 GREENLEAF, Op. cit., supra note 7, §14(y).
Is Of course, in order for the case to go to the jury, the plaintiff, since he has
the burden of proving the fact of death, must first produce sufficient evidence
to convince the judge that a jury could reasonably draw an inference of death
from the evidence. If he fails to give this showing, the case is not submitted
to the jury but a non-suit or a directed verdict is given. See Thoe v. Chicago,
M.&S.P.R.Co., 181 Wis. 456, 460, 195 N.W. 407 (1923) where the court said
that where motions for non-suit or directed verdict are made, the court is
asked "to determine whether or not, admitting all the evidence against the
party making the motion.to be true anid drawing all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn therefrom in favor of the opposite party, the evidence is
sufficient in law to sustain a judgment against the moving party."
195s]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
process they will employ will be that of drawing an inference of the
fact of death from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff.
Since the "presumption of fact" does not compel the jury to find
in favor of the presumed fact in the absence of contrary evidence, is
it really a "presumption" at all or merely a permissive inference?
The Minnesota court said:
"We agree with Dean Wigmore (5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed.,
sec. 2491) that strictly speaking, all presumptions are those of
law, and that there are, in the proper sense, none of fact. When
we leave law for fact, it is better tb speak of inference, or de-
duction, or mere argument, rather than presumption."' 9
Since neither inferences nor presumptions of fact affect the duty of
going forward with the evidence because neither of them compel the
presumed fact to be found by the jury in the absence of contrary
evidence, it would seem that "the employment here of the term 'pre-
sumption' is due simply to historical usage, by which 'presumption'
was originally a term equivalent, in one sense, to 'inference'. ' 2 1
We have attempted to show that the effect of a presumption of law
is to compel a finding in favor of the presumed fact in the absence
of contrary evidence and that its function, therefore, is to require the
opponent to come forward with rebutting evidence. Let us now go
a step further by supposing that the opponent accepts the challenge.
Two questions immediately arise: first, how much evidence need he
produce to overcome the presumption, and second, upon the close of
all the testimony in the case, should the judge instruct the jury that
they should consider the presumption as evidence ?21
As to the first question, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that the presumption will control in the absence of any
credible evidence to the contrary. That is, as soon as credible evidence
is introduced which would support a finding of the non-existence of
the presumed fact, the presumption is rebutted. In Smith v. City of
Green Bay," the court held that the presumption that the deceased
exercised due care for his safety "disappeared upon the introduction
of evidence establishing as a fact the negligence of the deceased."'2 3
The Smith case was followed in a decision rendered in 1953 when
the court stated that "all presumption of due care in lookout went out
of the case when the evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding
19 Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557, 559 (1939) ;
See also Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okla. 257, 226 P. 65, 68-69 (1924) where
the court in distinguishing between presumption of law and inferences ob-
served that an "inference" is sometimes referred to as a "presumption of fact";
95 A.L.R. 162.
20 9 WIGMORE, op. cit., supra note 11.
21 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the effect of "conflicting" pre-
sumptions. On this point, see 9 WIGmORE, §2493.




came in." 24 The rule that "any" evidence to the contrary is insufficient
to rebut a presumption has been applied by the Wisconsin court to
various presumptions. In a case involving the validity of the verifica-
tion of a complaint, which appeared on its face to have been sworn to
before a notary public, our court declared that the presumption which
attaches in favor of the. regularity and correctness of official acts could
not be overcome by uncertain, unreliable and conflicting testimony.25
In State ex rel. Northwestern Development Corp. v. Gehrz,2 6 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the presumption that a condition
or status once proven to exist is presumed to continue could not be
rebutted save by "some uncontradicted and unimpeached, and not
inherently incredible, evidence to the contrary. '2 7 While "any" evi-
dence to the contrary will not operate to rebut the presumption, our
court has recently declared that the opponent is not required to produce
more than that amount of evidence which would enable the jury
reasonably to find in his favor.28 The result of the foregoing cases
appears to be this: whenever facts giving rise to a presumption are
proved, the presumed fact must be found as a matter of law unless
the party against whom the presumption operates introduces evidence
which will permit the jury reasonably to find against the presumed
fact.
The second question arises when the opponent has successfully
met the burden of going forward with contrary evidence and the case
is ready to be submitted to the jury. May the jury weigh the pre-
sumption in the scale with the evidence? That is, should the artificial
effect given to the facts by the presumption be given probative effect
by the jury? The view that is shared by the Wisconsin court (and
the majority of the courts that have had occasion to decide the matter)
is that the presumption is not evidence and that it, therefore, dis-
appears entirely from the case when the opponent has come forward
24 McCarty v. Weber, 265 Wis. 70, 73, 60 N.W.2d 716 (1953). See also Biersach
v. Wolf River Paper & Fiber Co., 247 Wis. 536, 20 N.W.2d 658 (1945) ; Carl-
sen v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 255 Wis. 407, 39 N.W.2d 442 (1949);
McNamer v. American Ins. Co., supra note 14; Bassil v. Fay, 267 Wis. 265,
64 N.W.2d 826 (1954).
25 State ex rel. Cleveland v. Common Council of the City of West Allis, 177 Wis.
537, 188 N.W. 601 (1922).
28 Spra note 14.
27 Ibid. at 421-422.
28 Will of Donigan, 265 Wis. 147, 150, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953) (presumption of
revocation by destruction arises from the failure to find a will last known to
be in the testator's possession. The trial court was reversed because it "was'
in error in its expressed belief that evidence clear and strong and greater than
a mere preponderance was required to overcome the presumption.") ; See also
In re Faulks' Will, 246 Wis. 319, 349, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945) where the court
said: "Where some evidence to the contrary is received, that is, evidence
which if uncontradicted is sufficient to support a finding, the presumption is
destroyed or removed; it then has no probative force."
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with evidence sufficient to support a finding in his favor.2 9 In McCarty
v. Weber, 0 the Wisconsin court announced:
"In Reichert v. Rex Accessories Co. (1938), 228 Wis. 425, 438,
279 N.W. 645, 651, we adopted Prof. Wigmore's rule expressed
as follows: '. . . It must be kept in mind that the peculiar effect
of a presumption "of law" . . . is merely to invoke a rule of
law compelling the jury to reach the conclusion in the absence
of evidence to the contrary from the opponent. If the opponent
does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the
judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption dis-
appears as a rule of law, and the case is in the jury's hands free
from any rule.' "31
In its application of Prof. Wigmore's rule, the Wisconsin court held
that after the defendant had produced evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the deceased was negligent, the plaintiff was not entitled
to have the presumption that the deceased exercised due care for his
safety "thrown into the scales and weighed by the jury in finding
the facts. This would give the presumption standing as actual evi-
dence. That it is entitled to no such standing is well established.
3 2
In the Gerhz*s case, it was stated that the presumption in favor of the
continuance of a status or condition once proven to exist is
"not in and of itself in the nature or character of actual evi-
dence ... and it disappears and is of no weight or significance
whatsoever when . . . there is some uncontradicted and unim-
peached, and not inherently incredible, evidence to the con-
trary.
34
The view of the majority opinion on this problem has been quaintly
expressed by the Missouri court when it suggested that presumptions
should be regarded as "the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but
disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts."
35
The majority view has been criticized on the ground that it fails to
invest the presumption with sufficient weight and dignity.38 The advo-
cates of the minority view maintain that the reasons which cause the
creation of presumptions should not be so weak that they will vanish
in the face of contrary evidence which might not be believed by the
jury. Since the presumption rules the case if the facts which give rise
2995 A.L.R. 878; 9 WIGMORE, op. cit., supra note 11, §§2490-2491.
30 Supra note 24.
31 Ibid. at 73.
32 Smith v. City of Green Bay, supra note 14 at 430.
33 Supra note 14.
34 Ibid. at 421-422; See also the quotation from In re Faulks' Will, supra note 28,
and McNamer v. American Ins. Co., supra note 14.
3 5 Machowik, v. Kansas City, St. J.&C.B.R.Co., 196 Mo. 550, 94 S.W. 256, 262
(1906).30 McBaine, Presumptions: Are They Evidence? 26 CALIF. L. Ruv. 519, 532-534
(1938); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, supra note 5.
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to the presumption are unopposed, it should continue to control the
decision if the evidence advanced against the presumed fact is dis-
believed by the jury.37 Evidence that is disbelieved is equivalent to
no evidence at all and the facts against which disbelieved evidence
is advanced are just as strongly "unopposed" as they would be had
no contrary evidence at all been introduced. The proponents of the
minority view further point out that under the majority position a
socially desirable presumption could be easily defeated by the testimony
of a witness who had no qualms about giving false testimony.38 An
illustration will best serve to demonstrate the basic distinction between
the two views: Let us assume that the death of X is at issue and that
the plaintiff has proven the facts which give rise to the presumption
that X is dead (viz., that X has been absent from his home for seven
years and has been unheard from during such period). Let us further
assume that the plaintiff then rests his case and that the defendant
comes forward with witnesses who testify that they recently saw X
and that he was alive and healthy. Under the majority opinion, the
presumption vanishes from the case and the jury is free to find for the
plaintiff or for the defendant. Under the minority view, the pre-
sumption does not vanish. Instead, the jury is instructed that should
they believe the defendant's witnesses they must find for the defendant
but that should they disbelieve them they must then find for the plain-
tiff by virtue of the presumption.
A further weakness in the treatment of presumptions under the
Wigmore-Greenleaf view is revealed in a case which involves the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts have floundered in a sea of con-
fusion in deciding whether to treat the doctrine as raising a pre-
sumption or merely an inference of negligence.39 If it is regarded as
giving rise to a presumption, it disappears in the face of contrary evi-
dence and the court cannot instruct the jury on the doctrine. If, how-
ever, it is treated as creating a permissible inference, at the close of
all the testimony the court must instruct the jury on the doctrine. This
situation results in a paradox in that it assigns greater weight to an
inference than it does to a presumption. 40
Much of the confusion attending the procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur that is found in the earlier cases stems from a failure to
properly analyze the functions of presumptions and inferences. In
the more recent cases wherein the courts have noted the legal distinc-
tion between a presumption and a permissible inference, the conclusion
3 See Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 La. 24, 257 N.W. 445 (1934);
Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 N.W. 536 (1919).
38 McBaine, supra note 36.
39 53 A.L.R. 1494; 167 A.L.R. 658.
40 Of course, in the absence of rebutting evidence res ipsa loquitur would result
in a directed verdict for the plaintiff if it were regarded as a presumption.
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reached is that res ipsa loquitur merely permits the jury to find the
defendant negligent4 ' and that "it makes a jury question out of an
issue which otherwise would fail for lack of proof. ' 42 Failure to note
the true distinction between presumptions and inferences led the Wis-
consin court in 1904 to state that res ipsa loquitur raised a rebuttable
presumption of negligence. If this were true, the plaintiff would be
awarded a directed verdict unless the defendant produced rebutting
evidence. In that case,43 however, the court went on to treat the doctrine
as creating an inference because it said that "The proof was suf-
ficient, therefore, when the plaintiff rested her case, to take the
question of defendant's negligence to the jury."" In 1930, the Wisconsin
court suddenly departed from its traditional position by holding that
res ipsa loquitur gave rise to a presumption of negligence which would
result in a directed verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant did not
come forward with contrary evidence.45 In a decision rendered in
1944, the court admitted that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as
expounded by the Wisconsin cases, offers some difficulties."4 6 Recent
cases have affirmed the earlier cases thereby bringing Wisconsin into
the ranks of the majority opinion on this problem.4 7 In Ryan v.
Zweck-Wollenberg Co.,48 the court said:
"in spite of possibly inconsistent statements on the question
in some decisions of this court, it is the established law of this
state that the procedural effect to be given to res ipsa loquitur is
that of permissible inference rather than that of rebuttable
presumption. 49
The reason for so treating the doctrine is because the plaintiff, in
the vast majority of cases, is wholly unable to offer any evidence to
rebut the contrary evidence of the defendant.
While it is settled that res ipsa loquitur gives rise to an inference
of negligence, a further problem arises as to whether the plaintiff may
take advantage of the general inference of negligence which the doc-
42 167 A.L.R. 659; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20
MINN. L. REv. 241, 245.
42 Mayer v. Boynton Cab Co., 267 Wis. 486, 489, 66 N.W.2d 136 (1954).
4 Klitzke v. Webb, 120 Wis. 254,,97 N.W. 901 (1904).
44 Ibid. at 257. Subsequent cases expressly held that res ipsa loquitur creates an
inference rather than a presumption of negligence. See Lipsky v. C. Reiss
Coal Co., 136 Wis. 307, 117 N.W. 803 (1908) and Rost v. Roberts, 180 Wis.
207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923) ("In such cases it is held that the plaintiff makes a
case for the jury to infer negligence from the fact that the injury or accident
occurred.")
45 Dehmel v. Smith, 200 Wis. 292, 227 N.W. 274 (1930). In this case, Justice
Eschweiler wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined in by Chief Justice
Rosenberry and Justice Fritz in which he contended that the majority errone-
ously departed from the doctrine stated in the Rost case (ibid.).
46Koehler v. Thiensville State Bank, 245 Wis. 281, 286, 14 N.W.2d 15 (1944).
47 Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954) ; Mayer v.





trine raises if in his complaint he alleges two causes of action one of
which is based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the other on
specific acts of negligence. If the plaintiff fails to prove his specific
allegations, should he be permitted to rely on the general inference
of negligence? A learned writer in this area of the law feels that
"this is not a question of evidence, for the inference is there;
it is a question of the policy of the court as to the effect of
specific allegations in the pleading in limiting the issue."50
The American courts have taken the following four positions on this
question :51 (1) that the plaintiff by his specific allegations has waived
his right to rely on the doctrine; (2) that he may take advantage of
it if the inference of negligence to be drawn supports the specific
allegations; (3) that it may be applied only if the specific allegations
are accompanied by a general allegation of negligence; and (4) that
it is available without regard to the form of the pleadings. While
the issue has not yet been decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
it has recently arisen in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County. In
an opinion filed on February 25, 1955 Judge Francis X. Swietlik
ruled that the specific allegations of negligence in the plaintiff's com-
plaint did not remove the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from the case.52
SUMMARY
A presumption is essentially a rule of law which compels a certain
finding of fact when a specified group of unopposed facts is proven.
It casts upon the party against whom it operates the procedural duty
of going forward with evidence sufficient to warrant a jury to find
against the presumed fact. The term "presumption of fact" should
be discarded since it does not impose any duty as to the production
of evidence; it is a deduction from the facts of the particular case
which the jury is permitted, but not compelled, to draw and is there-
fore merely another name for "inference of fact."
A presumption is rebutted (i.e., ceases to control the decision)
when the opponent introduces credible evidence which would support
a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact. While the major-
ity opinion, which is illustrated by the Kreft case 53 states that a
rebutted presumption disappears from the case entirely, the author is
of the opinion that the majority view unduly restricts the office of
the presumption and submits that the better position is to allow the
presumption to rule the case if the evidence advanced against the
presumed fact is disbelieved by the trier of the facts.
DAVID KAISER
50 PROSSER, supra note 41 at 263-265.
5179 A.L.R. 40, 48; PROssER, TORTS (1941) 307-308.
52 Calla v. Mandella, Circ. Ct. Milwaukee County, Wis., No. 233-505.
53 Supra note 1.
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